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Populism, inequality and representation:                    




When Occupy London emerged with a global wave of protest movements in October 2011, it embodied and 
advanced discursive forms that have characterised the unsettling of political consensus following the financial crisis. 
The central claim that ‘We are the 99%’ staged a fundamental tension, between a populist appeal to the figure of 
‘the people’, and a contrary orientation seeking to critique inequality while rejecting forms of representation and 
identity. This article – which draws on three years of ethnographic fieldwork with Occupy London (October 2011–
October 2014) and a critical theorisation of the figure of ‘the people’ in radical movements – follows movement 
participants’ negotiation of the tension at the heart of the discourse of ‘the 99%’. It offers an account of the 
conflicting meanings and practices that emerged, arguing that the result was a creative contradiction that sustained 
the movement for a time, while setting the terms of its ultimate breakdown. Identifying the concept of 
‘representation’ as the site of particular controversy, this is unpicked through a number of key figures (Pitkin, Marx, 
Spivak, Puchner, Deleuze and Guattari) as the basis for an empirical account of Occupy’s practice of assembly, 
which offered partial, imperfect ‘solutions’ to these tensions. The article concludes with some implications for the 
limits and possibilities of both a grassroots populism and a politics against representation, in the context of political 
developments since. 
Keywords 




The Occupy movement, which emerged with an international wave of protests in 20111, was a laboratory 
of ideas and practices which have marked an unsettling of political consensus in the post-crash era. Its 
iconic slogan, ‘We are the 99%’ – raucously chanted in the occupied squares, printed on placards, daubed 
on banners and tent-sides – began life in Occupy Wall Street, and was enthusiastically translated to London 
when the occupation outside St. Paul’s Cathedral began on 15th October 2011. The slogan’s claim 
remained an important site of Occupy London’s discourse throughout the months of occupation and the 
years of movement disintegration and relocation. We are now in a different political conjuncture, but the 
events of Occupy London, and the idea of ‘the 99%’, mark an important staging-post in the subsequent 
                                                          
1 Occupy London, the focus of this article, was initiated as Occupy the London Stock Exchange on 15th October 2011, as 
part of a global day of action, initiated by Spanish activists from ¡Democracia Real YA! In the context of the ‘Arab 
Spring’, indignant movements of Southern Europe, and Occupy Wall Street in the US. The principal occupation camp at 
St. Paul’s Cathedral was evicted on 28th February 2012. A second camp at Finsbury Square was maintained until June 
2012. Several organisational forms from the camps lasted long after eviction. This research followed these over three 





unfolding of populist frustrations and insurgent possibilities. Looking back at the assembling Occupiers, 
we can see the germinal concatenation of ideas and forces whose ideological tenor and organisational form 
were still undetermined. Indeed, their reterritorialisation in disparate and still-moving phenomena from 
Brexit to Corbynism suggest that their virtual potentials are still not fully actual. It is therefore important to 
understand the grassroots beginnings of present dilemmas, and indeed to identify the theoretical and 
empirical disputes that have animated them. 
The idea of ‘the 99%’ was the locus of a profound tension between contradictory political modes. It 
articulated a populist orientation, centring on the idea of ‘the 99%’ as the great collective of ‘the people’. 
However, this tendency, with its dynamics of representation and identity, ran against a contrary orientation 
for which such dynamics were anathema. Within this anti-identitarian orientation, ‘the 99%’ did not refer 
to a collectivity at all, but instead named the fact of inequality, seeking not the gathering of a collective 
subject, but the dispersal of moblisation along lines of difference. The conflict around fundamental 
political themes of representation, collective subjecthood and the framing of grievances, provides critical 
insights in the organisation of radical movements and the wider reformulations of the post-crash period.   
This article offers an analysis of that defining tension and its negotiation. Drawing on three years of 
participant-observation between October 2011 and October 2014, it bears down on the complexities and 
contradictions of movement discourse and praxis to argue that it was the creative friction between 
opposing poles that generated the potency of the idea of ‘the 99%’. Identifying the idea of representation 
as a central site of contestation, I argue that Occupy’s practice of assembly – not simply an organ of 
decision-making but a mode of composition – responded to the need to resolve these tensions, but this 
was dependent on the context of increased mobilisation which ultimately ended. The empirical discussion 
of assembly shows how these theoretical tensions manifested in concrete practice.  
This article contributes to the empirical engagement with Occupy London (Burgum 2018, Gledhill 2012; 
Halvorsen 2014, 2017; Köksal 2012), and builds on early analysis of ‘the 99%’, which variously focuses on 
the relationship with democratic discourse (Calhoun, 2013; Della Ports, 2012; Graeber, 2013), class 
composition (Dean, 2012; Endnotes, 2013), public space (Bintliff, 2012), or contemporaneous populisms 
(Grigera, 2017; Kerton, 2013). It is positioned between analyses focusing on populist features (Gerbaudo, 
2012, 2017; Mason, 2012) and those explicitly problematising the implied erasure of social difference in 
the name of representation (Arditi, 2012; Juris et. al, 2012; Thoburn, 2015). This is brought into dialogue 
with emerging debates regarding the nexus of movements and populist politics (Kioupkiolis, 2016; 
Roberts, 2015). 
My argument is original, but builds on its partial identification elsewhere. Kioupkiolis and Katsembekis 
(2014) posit the 2011 movements’ dramatisation of a conflict between a hegemonic politics centring on 
‘the people’, and a networked project of the ‘multitude’, drawing here on Hardt and Negri (2000, 2004). 
The debates I enter are most usefully opened up by Paulo Gerbaudo’s (2017) argument that post-2011 
movements exhibit a synthesis of ‘popular identity’ and internet-age networked individualism, in what he 
terms ‘citizenism’. This has important lacunae, in part resulting from the otherwise productive desire to 
account for a common ‘imaginary’ across geographies and times. My ethnographic and sociological 
concern, in contrast, attends to the playing-out of these problems in a concrete site, leading to a picture 
less of synthesis than often irresolvable conflicts.   
Ethnographic methods could extend somewhat ‘naturally’ from my own involvement in Occupy, which 
preceded the research. I pitched my tent at the Finsbury Square camp one week in, and attended meetings, 
assemblies and actions at St. Paul’s and across London. After eviction, I chose to follow those spaces and 
groups still identifying as Occupy London, explicitly attempting to extend that project and address those 
problems. I was in the organising group of attempted reinvigorations of Occupy throughout 2012, 
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attended assemblies and an international convergence in Madrid, and hung out in a network of friendly 
squats. Through 2013, I contributed to Occupy’s solidarity actions within a wider activist ecosystem, 
participated in all extant working groups, and joined the ‘Future of Occupy’ strategy meetings, leading to 
a brief reinvigoration of larger assemblies in 2014. These were three intense years of meetings, assemblies, 
protests, direct actions, police confrontations, court dates, arguments, parties and friendships, in which I 
shared in the ups and downs of a movement on the go. Fieldwork ended in October 2014, around six 
months before a General Election whose result ultimately brought about the election of Jeremy Corbyn 
as Labour leader, and a notable institutional turn in the anti-austerity, critical left. My research therefore 
does not cover that important, but subsequent political sequence. My field-notes across this period 
approach 150,000 words. I conducted 30 long-form interviews in 2013 and early 2014, plus countless 
conversations, and gathered all major documents produced by the movement from newspapers to 
collective statements. While there was a discrete period of NVivo coding and analytical close reading, 
analysis has occurred at every stage. 
The analysis begins, below, with a discussion of the populist discourse of ‘the people’, clarifying some 
implications for autonomous politics. I then turn to this paper’s organising tension, first outlining the non-
identitarian potential of ‘the 99%’ as critique of inequality, before moving on to discuss the ultimately-
dominant populist orientation. Through an ethnographic and theoretical discussion of the 
problematisation of representation, as it played out in Occupy, I conclude with the lessons this provides 
regarding grassroots populisms and consider some implications for our understanding of political 
developments since.  
 
‘The people are back’ 
Understandings of populism vary considerably, but some important points of orientation bear noting. 
Seeking to go beyond the word’s use as invective against one’s political enemies, Paul Taggart (2000) 
identifies populism’s common theme as the resentment of a monopolistic ‘power bloc’, where special 
interests have broken the mechanism of representation. Scholars committed to liberal democratic 
representation are inevitably alarmed, not least by the implication of an otherwise unsullied ‘people’. 
Populism, of the left and right, is rejected as ‘paranoid politics’ (Hofstadter, 1964), or as a ‘pathology of 
democracy’ (Mudde, 2003); the volonté générale gone to seed.  Elsewhere, some populist impulse is 
understood as central to democracy. Chantal Mouffe’s (2000) argument that the notion of popular 
sovereignty – and its figure of the legitimating ‘people’ – is inherent to democratic discourse, is echoed in 
Margaret Canovan’s (1999) idea of democracy’s ‘redemptive’ aspect unsettling and reinvigorating 
‘pragmatic’ governance. This is populism as ‘the drunk at the party’ (Arditi, 2007), interrupting political 
rule with insurgent memories. This is important if indeed neoliberalism has decentred the demos as the 
underwriter of political legitimacy (Brown, 2015). We may sympathise with Eric Fassin’s (2018) suspicion 
of a progressive populist exodus from neoliberalism (certainly given his French context). Nevertheless, 
populisms may at least open up the ‘politically thinkable’ (Azmanova, 2018) in late neoliberal times.  
On the radical left – broadly conceived – the most influential discussion of populism has come from the 
co-authored and individual works of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; 
Laclau, 1977, 1994, 2005; Mouffe, 2000, 2018), the focus of a growing literature with the rise of left 
populisms this decade (Howarth, 2015; Thomassen, 2016). A central point of their neo-Gramscian 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (1985) suggests that post-industrial society has decentred the working class as 
a plausible agent of historic change, as apparently demonstrated in the composition of the ‘New Social 
Movements’. In keeping with their post-Marxist project of ‘radical democracy’, emphasising the sphere of 
politics rather than production, they propose ‘the people’ as a substitute. Populism, Laclau emphasises 
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(2005), is not an ideology but a logic, invoking the great ‘people’ and an antagonist ‘power’. The project at 
hand is to build ‘chains of equivalence’ between particular demands, and their constituencies, to establish 
the discursive frontier between ‘them’ and ‘us’.  
Others have called into question the progressive potential of ‘the people’. The influential critique of 
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000, 2004, 2017), argues that, ‘The population […] is characterized 
by all kinds of differences, but the people reduces that diversity to a unity and makes of the population a 
single identity: “the people” is one.’ (2004, p. xiv). Such a single identity is an organising principle across 
the canon of political philosophy, in what Hanna Pitkin (1967) terms theories not so much of representation 
as authorisation. For Hardt and Negri, the sovereign people is a usurpation. Rousseau’s ‘general will’, they 
remind us, is not ‘the will of all’ – the plural expressions of the population, which can only be heard as ‘an 
incoherent cacophony’ (2004, p. 242) – but a functioning unity produced through claims to representation. 
This is a trick though: ‘The will, [Rousseau] explains, cannot be represented: either it is yours or it isn’t’ 
(2017, p. 27). The authors recognise that ‘the people’ has been invoked by resistance movements, but 
principally to legitimate authority. In electoral politics, populists may emerge from social movements, but 
eventually separate themselves, ‘affirming that political power is a domain autonomous from the social’ 
(2017, p. 23).  
This position had considerable currency during the alter-globalisation movement. Often associated with 
an organisational mode of dispersed, mobile networks (Juris, 2008), and the ‘small “a” anarchism’ 
(Graeber, 2002) of direct action and participatory processes, the representational foundations of ‘the 
people’ were troubling to many sectors of the movement. In Marianne Maeckelbergh’s suitably titled The 
Will of the Many (2009), the movement’s horizontal networks are characterised by the espousal of radical 
difference and creative conflict – between particular nodes, constituencies and affinity groups – and a 
principled rejection of unity.    
While Occupy bore this heritage, 2011 also brought claims to unity, identity and representation back into 
the centre stage of movement politics. From the Spanish 15M movement’s emphasis on ‘real democracy’ 
to the portrayal of Egypt’s Tahrir Square revolutionaries as ‘the Egyptian people’ (Dösemeci, 2013), a 
populist orientation now jostled with alter-globalisation forms. Although the origin stories of ‘We are the 
99%’ are contested, David Graeber’s (2011) account refers to a then-recent Joseph Stiglitz (2011) article, 
‘Of the 1%, by the 1%, for the 1%’, and Occupy Wall Street organisers’ decision to position theirs as a 
movement of ‘everybody else’.   Paolo Gerbaudo (2012, 2017) has argued that these movements entailed 
a ‘popular identity’ (Laclau, 2005) casting themselves as  ‘the entirety of the citizenry, rather than a marginal 
group of rebels’ (Gerbaudo, 2012, p. 3), as alter-globalisation activists apparently did. For Gerbaudo, these 
movements combine a politics of populist hegemony with an attendance to individual difference and 
networked complexity, as reflected in the central figure of the ‘citizen’. An edited volume from Alexandros 
Kioupkiolis and Giorgios Katsembekis (2014), articulates the occupation movements’ staging of a tension 
between the Laclauian programme of counter-hegemonic blocs, and the Negrian politics of the ‘multitude’, 
distributed non-hierarchical networks. This usefully affirms the liminal, contradictory position between 
two different moments and modes of dissent. In their account of Greece’s aganaktismenoi they conclude 
acts of collective speech and media engagements meant the constant resurfacing of otherwise disavowed 
forms of representation and identity. The emergence of ‘the people’ is the ineradicable possibility of any 
such mobilisation. 
The tensions between these divergent positions on the validity and utility of ‘the people’ for a radical 
politics played out as concrete problems for London’s Occupiers, who demonstrated populist reflexes and 
anti-representational desires. I now turn in detail to that case, beginning with the first pole of that defining 




The breach of inequality 
From Occupy London’s effervescent early days, ‘We are the 99%’ was in constant circulation through 
movement discourse, economic analyses and personal narratives. But what did people mean by it? For 
Maria, the answer was clear enough: ‘I think “the 99%” more than anything else shows the inequality of 
power and economic inequality in which we live, in our society and globally. It’s an expression of that 
imbalance.’.  This sense that it is an expression of imbalance was echoed elsewhere in participants’ insistence 
that the slogan named a social and economic condition: the reality of income and wealth inequality, and 
the related disparity in political influence, that is intrinsic to capitalism and intensified following the 
financial crisis.  In this sense the slogan was not a claim about some possible collective identity or agent 
(‘the people’ or any other) but was an assertion of the fact of inequality. As Nicholas Thoburn (2015) has 
argued ‘Framed in this way, inequality and exploitation signify not so much the control of one group, the 99%, 
by another, nor even the distribution of wealth, but the very form that life takes in such a system’ (p. 177). This calls 
to mind Marx’s insistence that a given mode of production ‘must not be considered simply as being the 
reproduction of the physical existence of the individuals. Rather it is the definite form of expressing their 
life, a definite mode of life on their part,’ (Marx & Engels, 2004, p. 42).  ‘The 99%’ called out a situation in 
which capitalism’s necessary inequalities determine the very patterning of social life.  
Occupy London’s founding document, the Initial Statement, called for ‘structural change toward authentic 
global equality’ and almost every research participant framed the Occupy project in terms of inequality. 
The slogan pointed toward a politics built around its critique. This was not a claim about the collective 
identity of the wronged, and not a claim by Occupiers to represent that mass. For Maria, the slogan ‘didn’t 
necessarily mean that we… it was a way of expressing the unfairness of the system’. Maria almost removes 
the troublesome ‘we are’ – with its implied representations and identities – and insists on the designation 
of a system. These statements reveal an awareness that the potential of the ’99%’ discourse was a politicising 
critique whose extension through the everyday social relations where inequality bites is potentially 
hampered by the gathering of homogenising identities.  
The slogan, and its surrounding discourse, aspired not just to a descriptive statement on inequality, but a 
transformative ‘breach’; a critical rupture (Thoburn, 2015) diffusing across the social. In their early 
response to the events of May 1968, Edgar Morin, Claude Lefort and Jean-Marc Coudray (1968) define 
breaches as social ruptures onto the possibility of radical social compositions. Gerald Raunig states that 
this can bring ‘uncustomary concatenations […] it actualizes itself as a new form of social organization’ 
(2008, no pagination). The non-identitarian mode of ‘We are the 99%’ sought just such a dispersing 
politicisation of people’s lives and the social grid. This echoes Jean-Marie Gleize’s (2011) poetic assertion 
that social insurgencies spread musically, through ‘resonance’ between particularities: ‘Something that 
constitutes itself here resonates with the shock wave given off by something that constituted itself 
elsewhere’ (p. 73).  
The spread of Occupy through 2011/2012 hinted at this potential, indicated by the ‘WeAreThe99Percent’ 
Tumblr blog that popularised the slogan in the United States. People uploaded photo-portraits, annotated 
with summaries of the individual situations through which the ’99%’ problematic was lived: ’61 years old. 
No healthcare, savings or pension. I am the 99%’; ‘While my taxes were bailing out my bank, my bank was 
squeezing me. I am the 99%’; ‘$85,000 debt. Two kids suffering so we can pay bills. We are the 99%’. 
Rehearsing common themes of debt, exploitation wages and insecurity, people saw themselves and their 
conditions within the slogan’s claim.   
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Twinned to this was the movement’s central command, ‘Occupy!’, which, early on, was all verb, having 
not stultified into the noun naming the movement’s organisation and territory (Matthews, 2018). The 
desire for proliferating occupations was a desire for ‘the 99%’ to catalyse mobilisation where the problem 
it named was felt. The highly visible dispersal of the occupation through proliferating encampments 
demonstrated the fact of ‘the 99%’ actualised as a transformative event; the mobilisation of inequality. 
Importantly, this demonstrative quality necessarily drew the movement into a certain regime of 
representations. The relay of new occupations offered a glimpse of the distribution of the problem of 
inequality, while any particular occupation, like London’s, necessarily began to fix forms of representation.  
It is important to note that understandings of inequality varied. The second edition of The Occupied Times 
newspaper stated, ‘We are participatory democrats, left libertarians, social democrats, liberal socialists […] 
But on the question of inequality, we speak with one voice’. This commitment to a pluralist process of 
collective constitution – central to Occupy’s critique of politics-as-usual – should not be dismissed. 
However, the triangulated egalitarianism included both the deep critique of capitalism as such, and a view 
that inequality had become excessive, but in ways that could be resolved by the policy interventions of the 
capitalist state. This latter tendency was behind the popularity, among many Occupiers, of The Spirit Level 
(Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009), a Keynesian treatise on neoliberal excess and the redistributive state. Occupy 
London was produced by many people with no prior experience of activism, many from newly precarious 
social groups (Graeber, 2013). Not only did more moderate critiques of ‘excessive’ inequality resonate with 
‘common-sense’ assumptions about political economy (never troubling the ideological axioms of 
capitalism); it also spoke to these new activists’ personal experiences.   
Navigating these ideological differences was a key organisational task facing the Occupiers, not least as 
differing orientations intersected with other social differences (class, gender, ‘race’) cutting across the 
assembled. The need to deal with this productively was, in principle, a major priority, especially given the 
scale and difference of the movement’s imagined constituency. An intense concern with ‘process’ – 
consensus decision-making, safe-space communications, and recognitions of uneven privilege – 
characterised the approach to meetings and assemblies, particularly early on. Perhaps more significantly, 
differences were partially resolved by the proliferation of broadly autonomous sub-groups with either 
casual social functions, or ‘official’ responsibilities for camp-maintenance or areas of political focus. People 
could work within more manageable groups with higher levels of internal affinity, built on common 
backgrounds or common projects. This was, however, fundamentally unstable, dependent not only on the 
gathering effect of the occupation, but also on the amassing of more people, avoiding the full crystallisation 
of these groups.  
 
Voice of the people 
While the insistence on inequality as the condition of life held off the need for any reference to identities 
and representation, these remained the immanent potential of the wider ’99%’ discourse and practice. The 
99%-as-critical-breach jostled alongside the 99%-as-identity. This tendency articulated ‘the 99%’ as the 
mass collectivity of the (potentially) united people. Implicit in the framing of the ‘99%/1%’ antagonism, 
this could only become properly significant when reinforced by the movement’s circulating ideological 
structures. In referring to the constituted identities of bourgeois democratic common-sense, this was a 
readily available framework for London’s Occupiers, but, as we have seen, we should not too hastily 
underestimate ‘the people’s’ potential detournement as the basis for radical constitution. While this tendency 
necessarily runs counter to the non-identitarian breach, it is not that, straightforwardly, one of these was 
‘really going on’.  Rather, for a time they both operated as the poles of a creative contradiction. 
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The sense here was that, rather than naming a systemic problem, ‘the 99%’ referred to an identifiable, if 
enormous, group. One participant, Joe, rehearsed the populist trope of the untainted people, saying ‘We 
have a completely unjust, unsustainable financial system. The 1% are the people who profit, the 99% are 
the people who suffer’. Matt’s words on the slogan extend this: ‘It was a statement of shared identity and 
grievance […] What’s our identity? Well, there isn’t an easy one… then we related it to this grievance: We 
are all the people that have been fucked over’. Here, Matt explains the sense of ‘the 99%’ as collectivity in 
terms of common suffering, invoking the apparent necessity of collective identity for collective action. 
Matt’s ‘we’ drifts between the mobilised Occupiers and the population beyond; the greater ‘fucked over’. 
Relations of representation surface at this foundational level. 
This is also associated with an aspiration for ‘unity’. For Ellie, ‘There’s the 1% – the heads of corporations, 
super-rich – and they’re running it for themselves; and everyone else should join together and defeat them. 
If we all did, we could’. When another participant, Rob, says ‘You are part of the 99% whether you realise 
it or not, and things won’t change unless those people make it change’, he articulates an aspiration for a 
unified bloc alongside the insistence that this includes those who may not ‘realise’, or accept, being so 
gathered. In the early days of Occupy Wall Street, the problems of this claim were raised by Baltimore 
black feminist collective W.&.T.C.H. who stated ‘If we want to use this figure to underscore how far 
polarized the rich and poor are today, fine. But those of us that don’t homogenize so easily get suspicious 
when we hear calls for unity’ (2011, no pagination). They highlight the uneven patterns of poverty and 
oppression, and the privileges that cushion the blow for many. In the ’99%’ identity they see the lament 
of a downwardly mobile middle class who generalise their new-found precarity. Devastatingly, they ask 
‘Why say “99%” when you really mean “me”?’. New experiences of precarity are an important dynamic in 
the re-composition of the working class, and a catalyst for collective action (Dean, 2012; Polanyi, 2002) 
but this critique of homogenising unity recalls the people’s usurping tendencies. 
Explicit reference to ‘the people’ occasionally surfaced too. One respondent, Rachel’s, reflections bear 
noting: ‘There was so much – not just hope, but expectation. There was agency now, and we were going 
to have it. And it was all “we”, from the first day. The great collective “we”. The people, really’.  This 
sense that Occupy embodied the newfound agency of that great sovereign agent recalls that common 
frame of the occupation movements, that economic and political crisis had awoken a ‘sleeping giant’. At 
its most exaggerated, this entailed the claim that Occupy London was ‘the voice of the people’. Donna 
echoes the sentiments of many, saying ‘It was literally the voice of the people; the voice of the people 
being heard’. Such claims were not simply canny legitimation, but were heart-felt reflections of a political 
discourse in which representing ‘the people’ had real currency.  
But the idea of representing ‘the 99%’ came up against the often fiercely anti-representation stance that 
also circulated. This led to interesting answers when participants were asked to explain the relationship 
between Occupy London and this wider ‘99%’. Jesse laughed at the question, saying ‘Well, the first thing 
that comes to mind it to say we represented the voices of “the 99%”, but that’s a dangerous thing to say 
in a movement like ours […] But it’s probably the best way I can describe it’.  This is echoed by Maria’s 
response: after several seconds pause, she abruptly said ‘Well, obviously we didn’t represent them!’. This 
dilemma of immediately thinking in terms of representation, rejecting this, but being stuck with it anyway, 
should be taken seriously. It highlights the degree to which Occupy London staged an ambiguity in 
understandings of representation, which offers insights regarding the tension at the centre of this paper. 
 
Representation and performativity 
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While the idea of representation has been much maligned within a certain activist milieu – certainly among 
many of Occupy’s antecedents – its implications for critical movement politics bears further clarification. 
Given the privileged role given to representation across the canon of political philosophy (Daremas, 2011), 
it is naturally a central concern for theorists of democracy. Its conceptualisation typically centres on some 
form of substitution, but the precise mechanics are contentious. An essential intervention came with 
Hanna Pitkin’s (1967) insistence on the etymological implications of re-presentation, as a making present 
again, a conjuring characterised by contradiction: representation is the making present in some sense of 
something that is not, in fact, present (1967, p. 8). Recognising this common theme, Pitkin argues that the 
term captures diverse social and symbolic processes, with disputes often centring on conflicting 
definitions. 
While Pitkin’s work has notes of deconstruction, Gayatri Spivak’s (1993) approach is explicitly 
deconstructionist, alongside a Marxist concern with the ideological function of such axioms of political 
modernity. Spivak argues that the pronounced problematisation of representation in some political 
philosophy (see Foucault & Deleuze, 1980) hinges on an essentialist error, running two distinct definitions 
of representation together. These are, Spivak recalls, disentangled in Marx’s Eighteenth Brumaire (1852) by 
two German terms, which avoid the confusion of the English: vertreten is to represent in the sense of 
speaking for, typical of political representation; darstellen is to represent something through symbols or 
images. This distinguishes representation as proxy from representation as portrait. Through this distinction 
Marx assesses the outcomes of 1848: as France’s small peasants had not developed a conception of 
themselves as a common class (a figuration in the common imaginary, a Darstellung), they turn to others to 
speak for (vertreten) their interests. The inept Louis-Napoleon can do this precisely because of his symbolic 
associations (monarchy, surname, title) in the ideological system of representations (Darstellung). These two 
forms of representation are, therefore, not entirely discrete, though they are distinct. 
Each has a considerable performative dimension, unsettling any notion of a transfer between already 
constituted entities: the pre-given represented and representing. Pitkin herself insists that political 
representation is paradoxical, because the act of representing actually constitutes the collectivity of the 
represented. If representation ‘makes present’ that which is not, the emphasis, for Pitkin, is on ‘making’. 
While the presence of that which is not appears contradictory, as Lisa Disch (2012) notes this is less stark if we 
consider the Derridean view that representation is always a supplement, not a secondary reflection of a prior 
thing, but the primary moment of production (Derrida, 1997).  
In the realm of symbolic representations, radical political projects are implicated not only in the task of 
depicting a reality but constituting that reality in the moment of enunciation. In his Poetry of the Revolution 
(2006), Martin Puchner argues that The Communist Manifesto is a project of performative poesis; seeking ‘to 
produce the “modern revolution” through an act of self-foundation’ (p. 2). Puchner’s central claim is that 
while the Manifesto depicts the historic potential of the working class, it also needs to produce that fact. It 
‘projects a scenario for which it must then seek to be the first realization’ (p. 29). A similar argument is 
found in Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) claim that Lenin had used revolutionary slogans to extract from 
the social mass the revolutionary proletariat, as an ‘assemblage of enunciation’ before the conditions were 
ready for it to exist materially. The performative aspiration of such a prefiguration-in-language, however, 
always hinges on its legitimacy to be spoken, as demonstrated by the fulfilment – or not – of its promise. 
‘Anybody can shout “I declare a general mobilisation”’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 90) but absent the 
conditions to actualise this, the statement is foolish. As Puchner has it, manifestos and slogans are in a 
fragile, liminal position between performativity and theatricality, the reduction to mere play-acting.  
In considering the way in which London’s Occupiers were reluctantly stuck with the claim that they 
represented ‘the 99%’, we must recall these complications in our understanding of representation: first, 
9 
 
the distinction between the representative proxy and the portrait; and second, the performativity which 
troubles the picture of clearly constituted identities. 
 
Assembly 
Nowhere do these tensions play out more significantly than in Occupy’s defining mode of composition: 
assembly. By assembly I mean not so much the organisational role played by assemblies, but the process 
of assembling an ever greater political collectivity; assembly as ethos more than form. The great amassing 
‘99%’, called to participate in the occupation’s constituent process, marked a partial, temporally-bounded 
‘solution’ to the controversy of representation. In a movement often criticised for a lack of demands, one 
clear demand was the command that people assemble, whether it was the call to ‘Occupy Everywhere!’ or 
the ‘Come and join us!’ of the Initial Statement. Many Occupiers saw the slogan as aspirational, associated 
with the expansive self-understanding of a movement propelled by the global relay of mobilisations. When 
I asked one participant, Andy, whether people in Occupy London meant that they themselves were ‘the 
99%’, he responded ‘I think we hope to be’. For Bernie, the point was to ‘include every human being in 
the process’.  This desire to include ‘everyone’ presents fundamental limitations, but its articulation of the 
hope motivating the movement is important. The ethos of ongoing assembly sought to undermine any 
clear distinction between an inside and outside of the movement, as that barrier was permeated by ever 
more people. To develop an earlier point, Joe emphatically declared that ‘Occupy is the voice of the people, 
so the people have to be there to voice themselves […] You want a continual influx of thousands, 
participating, taking ownership, listening and being listened to’. Here again the highly representational 
claim to being the ‘voice of the people’ is immediately troubled by the requirement that this people ‘voice 
themselves’. This form of representation – open to ongoing complication through the folding-in of the 
represented – is dynamic, not dependent on the stable identities of either the mobilised activist grouping, 
or the people beyond. The claim to performativity was sustained – and the threat of mere theatricality held 
at bay – so long as this continued.  
The occupation camp itself, and the organisational forms it engendered, demonstrated this process, in the 
way that movements so often render visible particular grievances or social assemblages. Its symbolic 
function helps clarify the ambivalence regarding representation. The claim to speak for (vertreten) ‘the 99%’ 
was indeed essentially inadmissible; in meetings and assemblies people insisted they spoke for no one. 
However, the amassing body of gathered Occupiers, relayed as images through news media and phones, 
was unavoidably a representation (Darstellung), of at least the mobilisation, and perhaps the wider 
constituency it claimed. This could never portray the totality of ‘the 99%’, but instead something akin to 
Walter Benjamin’s (1969) ‘non-compact mass’, a necessarily partial snapshot; as opposed to, say, the 
authoritarian ‘mass ornaments’ (Kracauer, 1995) of Nuremberg’s choreographed volk. The Darstellung of 
the camp was the portrait of a people-in-process. The General Assembly, the centre of collective decision-
making, gathered the milling crowds in demonstrations of grassroots democracy: loose concentric rows of 
people gathered around speakers bearing proposals, statements of solidarity, or personal testimonies, for 
hours. The General Assembly and the occupation were constantly being reconstituted by arrivals and 
departures. Numbers swelled or shrank, and the individuals changed constantly. Representation could not 
entail the transfer from one body, or identity, to another, as neither Occupy London nor the great people 
beyond, were so bounded. The self-presentation as ‘just an ordinary person’ by so many in the General 
Assembly was an insistence on the coextensivity of the two, and a rejection of the activist identity that 
represents a cut with the social (Anonymous, 2000; Thoburn, 2010).  
If ‘99%’ discourse relied on the ongoing fulfilment of its performative aspiration, something it could not 
handle was an audience. In the early days, I had reflected on the uneasy feeling of marching through 
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London streets chanting ‘We are the 99%’, as vast numbers watched from the pavements, pinned to walls 
and shop doorways, going about their normal business. Encountering this spectator’s gaze – from people 
who were surely members of that broad constituency Occupy claimed – disrupted all performative 
illusions. The threat of theatricality always loomed, and these moments undermined any legitimacy of this 
reduced troupe of Occupiers declaring themselves ‘the 99% ’.  
In fact, the sense of performative fulfilment was always dependent on the ground-level perspective from 
within crowds. In his commentary on Occupy Wall Street, Craig Calhoun (2013) says ‘Whether in an 
occupation, or marches or sit-ins, the participation of a crowd encourages the sense of being part of 
something bigger than oneself, of acting not just as a small minority of the population, but as “the people”,’ 
(pp. 6-7). A similar comment is offered by Alain Badiou (2012) on the ultimate failures of Paris’s May 
1968: “But we were all on the streets!” (p. 56) was the common sentiment of incredulity among participants 
caught up in the ‘intensity of compact presence’ (p. 35). The theatricality of Occupy’s claims was obscured 
by the immediacy of the crowd; the intensity of bodies, voices and movement producing the sense of ever 
more people.  
This was a problem. The sense of legitimacy in talk of ‘the 99%’ depended on that context of amassing, 
of one’s immersion in the indignant crowd, and the circulating awareness of events like this taking place 
in so many other locations worldwide. The long durée of Occupy London’s unfolding marked the 
progressive break-down of this possibility. As the winter of 2011/2012 advanced, the flow of new arrivals 
reduced, and people began to leave, or relocate away from the camp’s weather and stress. Occupy London 
became an increasingly bounded territory, socially and geographically (Matthews, 2018). Coinciding with 
this, issues of representation intensified around moments calling for people to speak for Occupy. However 
one might disavow representation, speaking to the media, or in the eviction court hearings, meant 
unavoidable Vertretung. Many viewed the Press Team’s specialist engagement with journalists as an undue 
concentration of power. These divisions sometimes paralysed meetings intended to prepare for impending 
eviction. This period coincided with a drift toward the regressive populist claim that Occupy represented 
‘the 99%’ through its ‘diversity’; membership of enough constituted identity groups – genders, ethnicities, 
class positions. As Vicky rather perplexingly put it, ‘We had at least 75% of the 99% there’.  
Ultimately though, it was during this period that the cry of ‘We are the 99%’ basically fell out of use. The 
‘99%/1%’ opposition still framed debates and conversations, but there was a palpable loss of confidence 
in declaring Occupy the movement of ‘the 99%’. Expressing frustration with fellow Occupiers at this time, 
Maria lamented ‘Some still believe we’re this mass movement […] so we need to be really inclusive of all 
these people who don’t give a shit, or even know Occupy exists’.  The post-eviction period, throughout 
mid-2012, was marked by attempts to reinvigorate the movement through street protests and to even start 
fresh occupations. The slogan rang out again when large crowds gathered (at the 2,000-strong ‘Meet the 
1%’ march in May 2012, or at the anniversary march that October) but the centrality of ‘the 99%’ had 
shifted. Its occasional resurfacing felt like an artefact whose fleeting potency came through conjuring a 
shared past, rather than opening up possible futures. Through 2013 and 2014, Occupy London existed 
largely as an ongoing network contributing to the wider field of grassroots mobilisations against austerity, 
climate change and state violence. The political moment had moved on, along with the currency of 
Occupy-era framings. For those still organising as Occupy London it was clear that this was one particular 
activist group within a wider ecosystem, rather than the leading edge of the masses. Not that this did not 
cause confused disappointment for some who had lived those intense early months.  In late Summer 2014, 
three years after the start of the London occupation, one participant lamented, ‘We are open to the world, 




Conclusion   
Within Occupy London, the slogan ‘We are the 99%’ catalysed a series of problems in the interstices of 
critique, grievance, identity and collectivity. While these tensions were multiple – their intensities shifting 
over time – the defining poles were, on the one hand, a radically non-identitarian critique of inequality, 
and, on the other, a populist articulation of the aggrieved people. The former sought a politicising breach 
in social relations, dispersing the mobilising potential of the insistence on capitalist inequalities. The latter 
gathered difference under the figure of ‘the 99%’ as unifying subject.  
The play between these conflictual poles produced a creative contradiction that was central to the 
movement’s potency, and the wider appeal of the ‘99%’ discourse. The movement’s defining practices – 
occupation and assembly – sustained this critical friction, articulating both the deterritorialisation of critique 
and the territorialisation of identities (‘the people’; ‘Occupy London’). As such, ‘We are the 99%’ could be 
claimed from the divergent political positions of the Occupiers, and further afield. Maintaining the biting 
point of this tension required holding off identity’s pull, through practices that defied the bounding of 
Occupy London. The breakdown of the slogan’s use marks the inability to sustain this, as first occupation’s 
expansion stopped, and then people stopped coming. Rather than a tactical failure of activists, this reflects 
the limitations of that moment, and its forms.    
The value of this case is first in its dramatisation of the discursive reconstitution following the financial 
crisis. The resurgence of the figure of the sovereign people emerges as a central concern in the desires and 
demands churned up by the relay of crisis, bail-outs and austerity. Its salience for a generation politicised 
at this time distinguishes it from a prior political generation – broadly the alter-globalisation left – in terms 
of attitudes to unity and identity, and in its increasing organisational and discursive pragmatism. This is 
not unproblematic. As I have shown, some form of representation is an unavoidable dynamic of 
movements, so long as the political operates within a symbolic terrain of images and language. But ‘the 
people’ tends toward the more troubling tendency to speak for. It can never be an a priori identity nor a real 
collective agent, but is always a discursive operation and bid for authority. However performative, its 
tendency is the bounding of identity. In contrast, the politicising breach is not about representation or 
legitimating speech at all; not the performative production of new identities, but the dispersal of critique 
along lines of resonance. To call upon a Deleuze-Guattarian (1987) language, this is a molecular unmaking 
of identities rather than the bounding of molar unity. 
The unmaking of the bodies and forms presented by liberal capitalist ideology and material life is a 
possibility opened up by crisis. Its fullest expression is a radically anti-identitarian mode of critique, but 
perpetual flight – pure undoing – is neither desirable nor possible. It is necessary to be drawn into the 
realm of representation and settled identities, but these should propose new possibilities for how we live, 
and remain open to further, progressive recompositions. The emancipatory significance of critical 
tensions, like the ones discussed in this paper, should be of particular concern as the institutional relocation 
of movement politics into phenomena like Corbynism intensifies the tendency toward more identitarian 
forms of representation, at the same time as it lends institutional power to certain indignant demands. The 
’99%-as-a-people’ had progressive potential by being bound not only to an oppositional critique of identity 
that held at bay, for a time, its most limited aspects, but also to an insistence that the condition of life of 
that people is one of inequality. The draw of dominant discursive forms means that they are likely to 
ultimately dominate. Still, their disruption points beyond the current distribution, marking the possible 
reconstitution of life in troubled times.  
‘The people’ is perspectival. It can be produced at the level of the street, a usually fleeting illusion from 
within the insurgent crowd, but the truer perspective from which it is apprehended is that of the state, 
surveying its dominion from above. It is the state that possesses powerful mechanisms and institutions by 
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which the (national) people is articulated. Hence, the populist reflex of the 2011 movements has ultimately 
found longer-lasting form in the explicitly representational modes of electoral politics. While the state can 
make space for this element of indignant desire, that other side of ‘We are the 99%’ – the critique of 
capitalist life and the identities it proposes – is less easily housed and disciplined. It remains an errant 
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